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Mohammad H atta , one of th e  two major political figu res of modern Indonesian 
h is to ry , died on March 14 of th is  y ea r. T ogether with S ukarno , he held a command­
in g  position both in building th e  p rew ar Indonesian nationalist movement and as a 
leader of the  Indonesian revo lu tion . And it was he who played th e  major role in 
guiding his coun try  successfu lly  th ro u g h  the difficult seven-m onth tran sitio n  p e r ­
iod following th e  official tra n s fe r  of sovereign ty  from The N etherlands at th e  end 
of 1949. T h erea fte r he remained largely  off cen te r s tag e , bu t continued in te rm it­
ten tly  for almost a decade to ex ert a significant influence on th e  course of h is coun­
t r y 's  political life.
Born in B ukittingg i on A ugust 12, 1902 into a prom inent and strong ly  Islamic 
family, Mohammad H atta was the grandson of a widely resp ec ted  ulama from Batu 
Hampar (n ear Payakum buh). His fa th e r , Haji Mohammad Jamil, died before H atta 's 
f ir s t  b ir th d a y , and he was ra ised  by the  family of his m other. Coming from a weal­
th y  family, she ran  h er own mail tra n sp o rt b u siness. H atta 's  in tellectual p reco ­
ciousness was soon ev iden t. In B ukittinggi he was able to s tu d y  Dutch as well as 
th e  Koran a fte r school, and his family helped d irec t him tow ards the best educa­
tional facilities available. A fter a ttend ing  th e  Sekolah Melayu in B uk ittingg i, he 
was sen t to the  Dutch language elem entary school (ELS--Europeesche Lagere 
School) in Padang from 1913 to 1916. When th ir teen ,h e  passed  the  exams en titling  
him to admission to the HBS (D utch Language Secondary School) in B atavia, bu t 
because of h is you th  his mother in sisted  he remain on for a while in Padang and 
f irs t a tten d  the MULO (junior secondary school) th e re . With e x tra  time on his 
h an d s, he took a job without h e r knowledge in the post o ffice--fo r which passing  
th e  HBS exam qualified him--while a t the  same time becoming in te re s ted  in politics. 
Via his MULO's soccer association, of which he was made chairm an, he broadened 
his con tac ts . In the  offices of th e  Sarikat Usaha (U nited E ndeavor), a m erchants' 
educational association led by T aher Marah Soetan, he avidly read  the  political 
coverage of the  available new spapers and rep o rts  of th e  Volksraad deb a tes . At 
th e  age o f s ix teen , his in te re s t in politics and the nationalist movement already  
well k in d led , he was chosen tre a su re r  of th e  b ranch  of the  Jong Sum atranen Bond 
th a t was f irs t estab lished  in Padang in  1918.
In 1919 H atta went to Batavia to a ttend  the HBS, where he completed his 
stud ies with d istinction  in 1921. The next y ear he d ep arted  for what was to be a 
decade 's  residence in  The N etherlands and en tered  th e  Rotterdam School of Com­
m erce. He earned  th e  degree of D octorandus (D rs .)  in  1932, a fte r having  stud ied  
in tensively  several fields of economics and completed all requirem ents for his doc­
to ra te  with th e  exception of th e  th e s is , which he never finished because o f his 
immersion in political life.
In Holland H atta quickly assum ed a position of leadersh ip  in the  major Indone­
sian nationalist o rganization , th e  Perhim punan Indonesia. He was its  tre a su re r  
from 1922 to 1925 and then  its  chairman until 1930. The P i's  unequivocal demand
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fo r Indonesia 's independence and th e  military tone of nationalism th a t Hatta ex ­
p re sse d  in meetings of the  organization and in its  jou rnal, Indonesia Merdeka, in ­
creasing ly  alarmed the Dutch au th o ritie s . T heir concern was fu r th e r  he ightened  by  
H atta 's  activ ities as Indonesian delegate to the League A gainst Imperialism beg in­
ning with its  establishm ent in 1927. (I t was th ro u g h  the League th a t he developed 
a close and long-lasting  friendsh ip  with N ehru; an d , like him, he eventually  became 
critica l of some of its  policies, e ith e r resign ing  or being expelled in 1931.) Later 
in  1927 he was a rre s ted  and im prisoned by  the Dutch for nearly  six m onths, along 
with four o th e r Indonesian nationalists active in the  Perhim punan Indonesia. At his 
tr ia l he made a sp irited  defense which gained him g rea te r prominence among Indone­
sian n a tio n a lis ts , and the  subsequen t publication of th is  speech u n d e r th e  title  Indo­
nesia Vrij (F ree Indonesia) became an im portant document of th e  nationalist move­
ment .
Upon re tu rn in g  to Indonesia in Ju ly  1932, H atta immediately became prom inent 
in th e  nationalist movement th e re , when he assum ed the  leadersh ip  of the  more ra d i­
cal of th e  residual components of Sukarno 's banned PNI (P arta i Nasional In d o n esia ). 
With th e  help of Sutan S jahrir and o th e rs , he built th is  up in to  a small b u t in fluen­
tia l political movement known as th e  Club Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian 
National Education Club) or PNI B aru (new PN I). They organized th is  around the  
p rincip le th a t a small body of w ell-tra ined , ded ica ted , and se lf-re lian t cadre  would 
have more s tay ing  pow er--and  ultim ately more in flu en ce--th an  th e  ty p e  of mass 
p a rty  th a t Sukarno h e ad e d , which th ey  reg a rd ed  as too re lian t on a few vulnerable 
lead e rs . T heir e ffo rts  lasted  for only a y ear and a h a lf, when H atta found th a t 
Dutch concepts of justice were much h a rsh e r in h is homeland than  in  Holland.
In F eb ru ary  1934 H atta was a r re s te d , along with S jah rir, B ondan, B urhanud- 
d in , and severa l o ther members of th e  Club Pendid ikan , and in carce ra ted  fo r most 
of a y ear in  B atav ia 's Glodok jail. T hen , still without tr ia l ,  th ey  were exiled to the  
notorious fev e r-rid d en  jungle concentration  camp of Tanah Merah at Boven Digul in  
w estern  New Guinea. In 1936 the  D utch tra n s fe rre d  him, along with S jah rir, to in ­
definite in ternm ent on th e  remote b u t more salubrious island of Banda N eira, where 
they  joined two o th e r p rom inen t, exiled nationalist le a d e rs , Iwa Kusum asumantri 
and D r. Tjipto M angunkusumo. T here  Hatta remained un til late 1941, w hen, on the  
v e ry  eve of th e  Japanese a t ta c k , the  Dutch evacuated him and these  o th e r national­
is t leaders to Java .
Hatta was reg a rd ed  by  officials of the  Japanese occupation adm inistration as a 
prom inent Islamic lead er, whose influence in  Indonesia was so g rea t th a t th ey  had 
to avoid antagonizing him too fa r . Like S ukarno , although H atta cooperated with 
Japanese a u th o rity , he is  generally  cred ited  with having  attem pted to use his posi­
tion to build Indonesia 's nationalist s p ir it ,  with ultim ate independence his goal. 
D uring th e  occupation he was appointed Vice Chairman of th e  P oetera (Poesat Te- 
naga R akjat) and la te r  of the  PPKI (Panitia Persiapan  Kemerdekaan Indonesia-- 
Committee for P reparation  for Indonesian In d ep en d en ce), as well as a member of 
several advisory  bodies.
With the  ou tb reak  of the  Indonesian rev o lu tio n , H atta immediately moved to the  
fo refron t of i ts  leadersh ip  alongside Sukarno. T ogether they  declared th e ir  coun­
t r y 's  independence on A ugust 17, 1945, an d , sh arin g  top au th o rity  as P residen t and 
Vice P re s id e n t, they  constitu ted  the  essen tia l apex of th e  national leadersh ip  th a t 
saw th e ir  coun try  th ro u g h  to independence. Throughout th e  five y ears  of national 
revolution th a t, in fac t, ended only in Septem ber 1950, th ey  usually  worked well 
and harmoniously to g e th e r. Their individual qualities and th e  popular images they  
evoked were complementary and mutually re in fo rc in g , co n tribu ting  to th e  a tta in ­
ment and maintenance of national u n ity --an  objective th a t obsessed  both of them --
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as well as to th e  d rive  and effectiveness of th e  revo lu tion 's leadersh ip . Both were 
convinced th a t the  p rice  of u n ity  was for socio-economic revolution to wait un til 
the  national revolution was com pleted, and th e ir  agreem ent on these  p rio ritie s  
helped hold them to g e th e r un til well a fte r the  tra n s fe r  of sovere ign ty . To S ukar­
no 's charism a, keen political p e rcep tiv en ess , and ability  to in sp ire  mass su p p o rt, 
H atta added organizational and adm inistrative talen t and an u n d ers tan d in g  of eco­
nomic problem s. Although no one could have described  him as charism atic , he ve ry  
clearly  p ro jected  a quality  of firm , se lf-a ssu re d , no-nonsense au th o rity  th a t few 
men were p rep a red  to contest openly . In th e  symbolism of h is dual leadersh ip  with 
S ukarno , H atta was seen as re p re se n tin g  Sumatra an d , more generally , those Indo­
nesians who took th e ir  Islamic religion most seriously .
H atta 's  influential position in governm ent gave many Sum atrans a g re a te r  con­
fidence in  th e  revo lu tionary  Republic and its  policies. D uring the  s tru g g le  against 
the  D utch , he served  as Y ogyakarta 's main liaison w ith, and rep resen ta tiv e  in , 
Sum atra, making num erous--often  h a za rd o u s--tr ip s  to the  is land . For six months 
following the launching  of the  Dutch a ttack  of July  1947, he remained based in 
B ukittingg i as head of the  R epublic's governm ent on Sum atra. A lthough only p a r ­
tially successfu l in  overcoming schisms among Sumatran civilian and m ilitary lead­
e r s ,  he provided an im portant countervailing  force for u n ity .
In Jan u a ry  1948, he re tu rn e d  to Y ogyakarta to take over as Prime M inister at 
a time when the b itte rn e ss  of in te rp a r ty  s trife  ru led  out ano ther p a rty -le d  govern ­
m ent. It was then  th a t ,  in the  face of a well-founded disillusionm ent and em bitter- 
ment tow ards the US, he successfu lly  in sisted  on Indonesia 's continuing adherence 
to an independent and nonaligned foreign policy--an  objective to which he was to 
adhere  th roughou t his life.
There is still no soundly based historical judgm ent as to how fa r his forceful 
in sistence  upon seeing th ro u g h  the draconian army rationalization for which Colonel 
Nasution and some o ther army leaders were p re ss in g , provoked the defection of 
pro-Comm unist m ilitary commanders whose positions were th e reb y  th rea ten ed  and 
consequently  led to th e  Madiun rebellion . But th e re  is no doubt th a t ,  once th a t 
challenge was underw ay , he dealt with it decisively and firm ly. The major re g re t 
he ex p ressed  when I talked with him about th is  episode was th a t some army officers 
d irec tly  violated his o rd e rs  th a t p riso n ers  who had been a rre s ted  in connection 
with the  rebellion be re leased --n o t m assacred--if they  could not be evacuated 
ahead of the  a ttack in g  Dutch fo rces.
H atta had only recen tly  re tu rn e d  from one of his many tr ip s  to Sum atra, and 
was ill, largely  from overw ork , when the  Dutch launched th e ir  su rp rise  blitz assault 
on Y ogyakarta on December 19, 1948. One consequence of his in ternm ent on the 
island of Bangka for the  nex t half y ear was th a t ,  relieved of his adm inistrative b u r ­
d en s , he was able to recover his health . And for me, th e re  was the  advantage th a t 
he could spare  the  time for long , search ing  discussions such as had been impossible 
in  th e  R epublic 's capital.
In early  Ju ly , a fte r Indonesian resistance  and mounting p re ssu re s  from o ther 
coun tries and from within Holland had forced th e  D utch governm ent to move tow ards 
accepting  the  R epublic 's claim to independence, H atta resum ed his position as the  
active head of its  governm ent. From A ugust 23 to November 2, he led th e  R epub­
lic 's  delegation to th e  Round Table Conference at The Hague for the  final negotia­
tions with th e  D utch. A lthough for the  most p a r t an effective nego tia to r, in the 
view of his colleagues Hatta placed too much t ru s t  in Merle Cochran, the American 
rep resen ta tiv e  th e re . While se rv in g  as Chairman of the  UN's Good Offices Commit­
te e , Cochran clearly  m isrepresented  the  actual tem per of a US Senate th a t had 
finally in te re s ted  itse lf  in the D utch-Indonesian  dispute, and the  scope th a t the
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Trum an A dm inistration was willing to  give Cochran himself in  the  negotia tions. On 
at least one is su e -- th e  amount of deb t th a t th e  new Indonesian governm ent was 
obliged to take  over from the  colonial adm in istra tion--it is  c lear th a t Cochran s e r i­
ously misled H atta as to W ashington's a ttitu d e , inducing  him to agree to a consider­
ably la rg e r deb t load than  was e ith e r equitable o r n ecessa ry . (H atta 's  subsequen t 
frig id ity  tow ards Cochran reflec ted  his realization th a t the  man in whom he had 
placed so much confidence had deceived him , and th is  was undoubtedly  one of the  
reasons for C ochran 's ineffectiveness as W ashington's f irs t am bassador to J a k a r ta .)
In th e  f irs t seven months of 1950, ju s t a fte r the  formal tra n s fe r  of Dutch sov­
e re ig n ty , H atta made one of his f in e s t, tho u g h , I th in k , often  insuffic ien tly  recog­
n ized , con tribu tions to his co u n try 's  political developm ent. With g rea t skill and 
ta c t ,  he serv ed  as the  resp ec ted  m oderator in th is  ten sio n -rid d en  tran s itio n  period 
d u rin g  which th e  federalist legacy of Dutch e ffo rts  at divide and ru le  gave way b e ­
fore th e  p re s su re s  of the broadly  based Unitarian movement th a t demanded its  liqu i­
dation . This involved not only delicate and arduous negotia tion , b u t also a d iffi­
cult p rocess of constitu tional rev ision . And it was du rin g  H atta 's  last to u r 
as Prime M inister, which ended on Septem ber 6, 1950, th a t the  complex, emotion­
ally c h a rg e d , and dangerous program  of reduc ing  th e  armed forces and fusing  the  
armies of th e  Republic with th e  residual KNIL (the Dutch Colonial Army) was mostly 
accomplished. In th is  period he was also able to make im portant p ro g ress  in the  
parallel e ffo rt to fu se , rationalize, and reduce th e  enormous b u reaucracy  left by 
th e  s tru g g le  against the  D utch--som e 240,000 Republican and 180,000 Federalist 
civil s e rv a n ts . Though the  p lanned overall reduction  to a composite body of 
230,000 civilian officials was nev er a tta in ed , H atta probably  tackled  th is  thank less  
job as effectively  as anyone could have done un d er the  circum stances.
That the  potentially  explosive passage from the  Dutch-im posed federal o rd er 
to a u n ita ry  Republic in Septem ber 1950 was a ttended  by so little  political traum a 
and bloodshed m u st, I th in k , be c red ited  to his statesm anship more than  to th a t of 
any o th er m an. It was one of th e  c ruel ironies of h is life t h a t , having  led his coun­
try  away from th e  d iscred ited  artificial federalist o rd e r th a t th e  Dutch had e s ta b ­
lish ed , he was never ab le, despite  p e rs is ten t e ffo rt, to move it tow ards the  genuine 
decentralization th a t he believed its  charac te r and political health  req u ired .
T h e rea fte r, on only th re e  occasions, and in ev ery  case only b rie fly , did H atta 
again assume a cen tral political ro le . When in m id-July 1955, S ukarno , momentarily 
outm aneuvered by  elements of the arm y, absented  himself from th e  coun try  on a 
to u r ab road , H atta assumed full p residen tia l pow er. In th a t capacity  he designated 
B urhanuddin  Harahap of the  Masjumi as form ateur of a cabinet th a t endu red  th ro u g h  
the  long-delayed elections and the  emergence of a new parliam entary  governm ent 
led by Ali Sastroamidjojo and the  PNI on March 24 of the  following y ear.
B eginning in  the last months of 1956, H atta once again moved u n der the  po liti­
cal spotlight with his s tro n g  public criticism  of the  Guided Democracy with which 
Sukarno and the army were aiming to supplant the  elected parliam entary  govern­
ment. H atta saw the  system of parliam entary  governm ent as basically sound and 
potentially  well su ited  to Indonesian conditions. It had failed th u s  fa r in Indone­
sia , he be liev ed , because it had not been appropria te ly  adapted to local conditions. 
Its  application in the postrevo lu tionary  period , he a rg u ed , had been a simplistic 
m irroring  of a varian t borrowed from The N eth erlan d s, one a ttu n ed  to Dutch r e ­
quirem ents and experience--no t Indonesian rea litie s. D espite the  force of his a rg u ­
ments , he was unable to p revail against the  powerful m arriage o f convenience b e ­
tween Sukarno and the  arm y. Wanting no place in the  au tho rita rian  government 
they  were in tro d u cin g , he resigned  from his position as Vice P residen t on Decem­
b e r 1, 1956.
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For most o f th e  next two y ears  he was occupied in m ounting a re a rg u a rd  action 
against the  p roponen ts o f Guided Democracy and in attem pting to head off the  th rea t 
of regional separation  p rec ip ita ted  in p a r t by  effo rts  at increased  centralization of 
power in  bo th  th e  governm ent and the m ilitary. In early  1958, with th e  ou tb reak  
of th e  PRRI and Perm esta rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, he was once again in 
a position of potentia l political im portance. It is logical to conclude th a t he stood 
a reasonable chance of succeeding in his strenuous effo rts  to find a common ground 
for compromise between Sukarno and the  d issident Masjumi political leaders within 
the PRRI. However, he had little  rap p o rt and influence with the  d issiden t colonels, 
on e ither Sumatra o r Sulawesi, who had been the  original in s tig a to rs  of the  reb e l­
lions. From the  ta lk s  I subsequen tly  had with him about these  developm ents, it 
always seemed to me th a t in  h is m ediating role he had been seriously  d isadvantaged  
by  the  ex ten t to which he was cut off from im portant intelligence th a t needed to be 
factored  into any successfu l e ffo rt at compromise. T h u s , Hatta and the Masjumi 
political leaders on Sum atra with whom he was try in g  to negotiate were apparen tly  
almost equally igno ran t about the  ex ten t of the  ties  of the  d issiden t regional colonels 
and th e ir  financial ad v ise r, P rofessor Sum itro, with the  CIA and th e  US and T ai­
wanese m ilitary estab lishm ents . Had Hatta still been Vice P re s id e n t, he would p re ­
sumably have been p riv y  to  th is  inform ation--w hich clearly  affected the  a ttitu d es  
of Sukarno and Prime M inister D juanda, as well as General N asution--and  his e f­
fo rts  at mediation might have been more effective.
A lthough these  abortive rebellions against Jak a rta  led to g rea te r centralization 
of its  pow er, H atta continued for many y ears  to argue cogently for a devolution of 
political, adm inistra tive, and fiscal au tho rity  in keeping with the  co u n try 's  expanse 
and d iv e rs ity . He held th a t ,  for a s ta te  of Indonesia 's p roportions and c h a rac te r, 
"democracy is  incompatible with th e  princip le  of centralism . . . . the  la rg e r the  
national te r r i to ry  and the  more d ifferen tia tion  in the  various aspects of life, the  
more specific problem s th e re  are  p e rta in in g  to these separa te  areas th a t cannot be 
dealt with from the cen tra l seat o f the  national governm ent." He re fu sed  to su p ­
p o rt those who advocated a sen a te , believing th a t such  an additional re p re se n ta ­
tive  body would slow the  p rocess of national governm ent too much. He reg a rd ed  
the ex isting  p a tte rn  of decentralization th ro u g h  proviees as largely  a facade, and 
was convinced th a t the  kabupaten  and its  o u te r island equivalents were the  ap p ro ­
p ria te  un its  for local self-governm ent and national e lections, and th a t the  p ro v ­
ince 's  chief function should be as a coordinating body for the  several kabupaten  
in its  te r r i to ry . Single-member election constituencies based upon the kabupaten  
u n i t , vo ting  on an absolute m ajority basis w ould, he was conv inced , have had a 
politically in teg ra tin g  e ffe c t, as well as more effectively rep re sen tin g  regional 
n eeds. Political p a rtie s  adapted to such a system could, he was convinced, have 
prov ided  a much s tro n g e r foundation for parliam entary governm ent than  th e  p a rty  
and election system th a t had been so m indlessly borrow ed from The N etherlands.
If the  kabupaten  were th e  major unit of national autonomy, H atta believed it 
would be possible to guide th e  g radual development of village self-adm inistration; 
bu t without th is  devolution and an increasing  se lf-ru le  at the  village level, it would 
be impossible to realize h is long-cherished  plans for village cred it and sales coop­
e ra tiv es . Having justifiab ly  earned  the  name of " fa th e r o f cooperatives" in  his 
c o u n try , H atta was deeply d isappointed th a t ,  a decade a fte r the  revo lu tion , his 
long e ffo rts  to root them in  th e  villages had proved a fa ilu re . In d iscussing  th is  
with me in early  1960 he ascribed  th e ir  weakness to two main causes--in su ffic ien t 
tra in in g  of local adm inistrative personnel and too little  financial su pport from the  
governm ent to get them far enough underw ay to s tand  on th e ir  own. He saw Indo­
nesia 's  Chinese as still perform ing a necessary  role in m arketing and d ispensing  
c red it in ru ra l society and believed th a t considerably more time and p reparation
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would be necessary  before it would be feasible to replace them with peasan t coop­
e ra tiv es  . He co n tin u ed , how ever, to see cooperatives as potentially  prov id ing  the  
means for ligh ten ing  the  p easan ts ' b u rd e n s , and helping in su re  th a t th ey  could hold 
on to th e ir  la n d . Cooperatives w ere , he believed , th e  most prom ising instrum ent 
available for giving the village the s tre n g th  to maintain a healthy  autonomy in the 
face of the  cen tra l governm ent's growing weight and for in su rin g  g rea te r social 
justice  for Indonesia 's exploited ru ra l m ajority, o r , as he p u t i t ,  "a b ridge  toward 
economic dem ocracy."
Although I was fo rtunate  enough to ta lk  to Hatta many times from 1948 to 1976, 
th e  last time I v isited  Indonesia, th e re  were th re e  periods which were especially 
conducive to ex tended  and in tensive  d iscussions and which proved particu la rly  
helpful to me in  exploring and u n d e rs tan d in g  his view s. The f irs t was in  May 
1949, when I v isited  him on Bangka where he had been in te rn ed  by  the  Dutch 
along with severa l o th e r prom inent leaders of th e  R epublic. The second was d u r ­
in g  my nex t v isit to Indonesia in 1954-55, when I was in th e  p rocess of e s tab lish ­
in g  th e  Cornell Modern Indonesia P ro ject. Among th e  leaders with whom I d iscussed  
its  p la n s , he was especially in te re s ted  and helpful in  estab lish ing  th e  guidelines of 
i ts  re sea rc h --b o th  for its  Indonesian and W estern p a rtic ip an ts ; b u t th e re  was an 
unexpected  e x tra  b e n e f it, for in. th e  course of ta lk ing  about the  k inds of resea rch  
th a t would be more useful to Indonesia we touched on a wider range  of subjects 
than  we would probab ly  have otherw ise d iscussed . A nother occasion for such ex ­
tended  ta lks arose d u rin g  his v is its  to Ithaca in 1960 and 1968 as a guest of Cor­
nell's  Indonesia P ro ject. A lthough some of these d iscussions were on sub jects well 
covered in H atta 's  w ritin g s, o th e rs  yielded im pressions about im portant aspects of 
his th ink ing  th a t I believe have not been widely app recia ted . In th e  hope, th e n , 
of making his ch arac te r and ideas a little  c lea re r , le t me re fe r  to a few of them .
F irs t, desp ite  th e  percep tion  th a t many have had , H atta was n o t--a t least in 
th e  middle years  when I knew him best--dogm atic  and r ig id . He did always in s is t 
on in te llectual p rec ision , and he had s tro n g  views on a num ber o f su b jec ts ; bu t I 
found him re fre sh in g ly  open-m inded and independent in  his political and social 
th o u g h t. One of my firs t im pressions when we talked  in  1948 and 1949 was his r e ­
fusal to ta lk  in doctrinaire  and stereo typ ical te rm s. This was evident even when 
we talked about men who were s trong ly  opposed to him politically. T h u s , he saw 
Musso as being "more of an anarch ist th an  a communist." S jarifuddin  was "too 
religious to be a communist," an d , if  he in sisted  on calling himself one, th en  it 
"must be a new k ind  of communism." Tan Malaka he respec ted  as a dedicated 
n a tio n a lis t, whose communism served  his nationalism , who was unwilling to accept 
any direction from Moscow, and who had a sound u n d e rs tan d in g  of Marxism.
(H atta was always justifiab ly  p roud  of h is own command of M arxist th eo ry  and 
lite ra tu re  and at th is  time recognized only one PKI lead e r--T an  Ling D jie--as 
being really  know ledgeable.)
B ut certain ly  about the  p rincip les he held most s trong ly  he was s tead fast and 
unyield ing . He never abandoned his belief in Indonesia 's m aintaining s tr ic t a d h e r­
ence to independence and nonalignment in foreign policy. Alignment on a p a rtic u ­
la r issue at a p a rticu la r tim e, yes; bu t never su rre n d e rin g  h e r independence and 
freedom of choice to a long-term  commitment to any pow er, no m atter what th e  in ­
ducement , economic o r o therw ise . He probably  argued  his position most eloquently 
in the  April 1953 issue of Foreign Affairs. The date of th a t artic le  was im portan t, 
for it appeared  at a time th a t John F oster Dulles was making clear th a t such  inde­
pendence was impossible in th e  bipolar world he and Eisenhower p e rce ived , and 
th a t Indonesia 's nonalignment meant aiding and abetting  the  Communist bloc. In 
la te r y e a rs , I sensed  th a t the  economic dimension of the  problem of m aintaining an
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independent foreign policy was the  one which most concerned H atta, and th u s  he 
appeared  increasing ly  w orried over Indonesia 's growing dependence on the United 
S tates and Japan .
His deep commitment to democratic governm ent i s , of c o u rse , well know n, and 
it  su rfaced  in nearly  all o f o u r d iscussions. He felt th a t to have taken  over the  
D utch system o f p a rtie s  and elections was a major mistake and th a t , as a conse­
quence , Indonesia had never had a fa ir te s t of dem ocracy. He was s trong ly  op ­
posed to functional re p re se n ta tio n , reg a rd in g  it as a device employed by govern­
ments for m anipulating politics so as to in su re  th e ir  own continuing dominance.
He was contem ptuous of th e  m ilitary 's assertion  of a r ig h t to a "dual func tion ,"  
seeing  th e  arm y's sp read  into adm inistrative and economic life as grossly  incom pat­
ible with maintenance of professionalism  and morale among officers and so ld ie rs , 
and as involving a level of co rrup tion  and mismanagement of th e  economy th a t was 
ru inous for the  co u n try .
T here  w as, how ever, ano ther subject about which he seemed to me to feel even 
more s tro n g ly . This was the  socio-economic role of Islam in Indonesian society .
It was on May 4, 1949, in one of o u r discussions on B angka, th a t he f ir s t  in tro ­
duced th is  su b jec t. "The basis  of Islamic th o u g h t,"  he sa id , "is in the  d irection 
of socialism , and it would be possible in Indonesia to make a w orking syn thesis"  
of Islam and socialism , with indiv iduals following Islam and socialism to g e th e r . He 
went on to observe  th a t "social justice  and the  b ro therhood of people are the  p il­
la rs  of Islam ; if  I have only one loaf of bread  for today and tom orrow , I must give 
half to a dying  man; th a t is the  economic basis of Islam ." As we d iscussed  the  
situation  fu r th e r ,  he made clear th a t what he believed best su ited  to Indonesia 
would be a mixed economy with a large socialist sec to r, a su b stan tia l cooperative 
sec to r--p rim arily  at th e  ru ra l level--and  a limited capitalist sphere  w hereby small 
business would continue to coexist with these  la rg e r sec to rs . He did not th ink  it 
would be necessa ry  to develop "a capitalist middle class before a basically socialist 
society could be estab lish ed , or even in o rd e r to have th e  necessary  adm inistrative 
personnel to man the appara tu s of a socialist socie ty ."  Most suitable for Indonesia, 
he be lieved , would be a m ixed, bu t heavily so cia lis t, economy, re s tin g  on demo­
cra tic  political foundations. A ccording to my n o tes, he concluded th a t discussion 
with the observation  th a t he felt th a t within his lifetime his people would have 
formed such a society .
H atta w as, of co u rse , disappointed in his expecta tions, and in la te r years  he 
came to lower his s ig h ts . But nev er did he abandon his belief th a t Islam could 
play a p ro g ressiv e  socio-economic role th a t would lead Indonesia to g rea te r social 
ju s tice . That idea was v e ry  much in h is mind in  ta lks I had with him in  1967, and 
then  and in subsequen t ta lks he exp ressed  great disappointm ent and b itte rn e ss  
th a t the Suharto  governm ent p roh ib ited  his estab lish ing  and leading a political 
p a r ty  dedicated to th a t goal. That one of th e  two principal founding fa th e rs  of a 
nation was denied such an opportun ity  and had his political freedom abridged  for 
th e  rem ainder of h is life , reveals th e  sense of in secu rity  of those who made these  
decisions.
But even though  shu t out from partic ipation  in po litics, H atta remained some­
th in g  of a political symbol, one th a t was d is tu rb ing ly  awkward for those who held 
pow er. For in th e  face of a governm ent th a t was increasing ly  d ictatorial and co r­
r u p t ,  he stood out as a so rt of s tu b b o rn  rem inder th a t political leadersh ip  in 
Indonesia had been possible w ithout these  qua lities, and th a t one of the  co u n try 's  
tru ly  g rea t men rem ained in tellectually  h o n e s t, u n c o rru p t, and genuinely devoted 
to social justice  and democratic governm ent.

